An Analysis of the Governance of Tadlac Lake using New Institutional Economics and Ostrom's Design Principles

Date

6-2024

Degree

Bachelor of Science in Economics

College

College of Economics and Management (CEM)

Adviser/Committee Chair

Emmanuel Genesis Andal

Committee Member

Veronica I. Castillo, Gideon P. Carnaje, Ma. Angeles O. Catelo

Abstract

This study was conducted to analyze the governance of Tadlac Lake by examining institutions (i.e. property rights and transaction costs) and assessing the extent of the presence of the Design Principles in the management of the resource. Tadlac Lake is a small freshwater resource that has a fishing community. Recently, its stakeholders planned to undertake ecotourism. This research utilized the Social-Ecological Systems - New Institutional Economics (SES-NIE) framework to examine interactions of various social and ecological variables and analyze institutions in the governance of Tadlac Lake. To fulfill the research objectives, key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with government agencies and a resort manager, while a focus group discussion (FGD) was done with fisherfolk. Responses were analyzed using thematic analysis. In terms of property rights, findings showed that Tadlac Lake is a state property, but it also bears characteristics of an open-access resource and private property. Despite laws regarding resource use, research participants raised doubts on the effectiveness of law enforcement; this is especially demonstrated by weak sanctioning. The concepts of property rights and sanctioning are both associated with specific Design Principles. On the other hand, transaction costs in the governance of Tadlac Lake were found to be minimized by stakeholder participation and by having a monitoring system that involves the appropriators themselves, instead of hiring external monitors. Both stakeholder participation and the resource’s monitoring system are also related to the Design Principles. Meanwhile, the slow and minimal progress of ecotourism planning appeared to be incurring high transaction costs.

Language

English

LC Subject

Right of Property, Transaction Cost, Institutional Economics

Location

UPLB College of Economics and Management (CEM)

Call Number

LG 993.5 2024 E2 S54

Notes

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Document Type

Thesis

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