Observed Punishment Spillover Effects on Cooperative Behavior

Date

6-2023

Degree

Bachelor of Science in Economics

College

College of Economics and Management (CEM)

Adviser/Committee Chair

Jefferson A. Arapoc

Committee Member

Ma. Nova R. Nguyen, Gideon P. Carnaje, Agham C. Cuevas

Abstract

This study attempts to find out if the spillover effects of observed punishment have a significant effect on cooperative behavior through the conduct of a simple economic experiment. The analytic framework developed was focused on the rational choice theory, incentives for cooperation and punishment, cost-benefit analysis, and the induced value theory. A public good game that lasted for two rounds was conducted on selected participants that were randomly distributed into three experimental groups. The researcher implemented two treatments—observed punishment and unobserved punishment. Summaries of frequencies, One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), and pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression method were the statistical analyses conducted to interpret the experiment results.

In the first round, the observed punishment treatment group was discovered to display the highest rates of cooperation. When the game was repeated for another round, the control group revealed a spike in their contribution rates whereas the treatment groups showed a significant decrease in their average contributions. This change in cooperative behavior could be attributed to the learning effect, which is also related to the participants’ strategic behavior during the experiment. Observed punishment is proven to have a significant effect on cooperative behavior, as well as certain socio-demographic variables such as degree program, age, affiliation status, and academic workload. Due to the internal validity of the experiment, the results of this study are only a small fraction of what can be observed with cooperative behavior in the presence of punishment mechanisms and can only serve as a guide for improved experimental designs in the future.

Language

English

LC Subject

Punishment

Location

UPLB College of Economics and Management (CEM)

Call Number

LG 993.5 2023 E2 D47

Notes

Viewing access to electronic resources is restricted solely to UP Gmail accounts. Any access and share requests from external organizations and personal email accounts will be promptly declined.

Document Type

Thesis

Link to Full Text

Share

COinS