The Impact of Size of Incentives on Dishonest Behavior in Reward-Based Systems

Date

1-2025

Degree

Bachelor of Science in Economics

College

College of Economics and Management (CEM)

Adviser/Committee Chair

Dr. Jefferson A. Arapoc

Committee Member

Ma. Nova R. Nguyen, Gideon P. Carnaje, Ma. Angeles O. Catelo

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Abstract

This study evaluates the impact of incentive sizes on dishonest behavior in reward-based systems. Incentive structures motivate participation and performance in real-world environments; however, such motivations can also excite unethical and immoral behavior. Using an experimental design, subjects from a freshman course participated in a task-based self-reporting environment that allowed an opportunity for economic incentives. The design was also an improved version of aggregate cheating observations, wherein sure cheaters would have been easily detected. Similar to previous literature, the findings revealed that the presence of varying incentives still elicit higher rates of dishonesty across the samples. However, no sure cheating was found amidst the presence of social biases and the Hawthorne effect. The results gained suggest that the size of incentives is not the only determinant of cheating behavior. Current academic year level, in-group and social desirability biases also influence the mental cost-benefit analysis (heuristics) of individuals. The results contribute to the understanding of other factors prior to making a cheating decision, providing more insights in the behavioral dynamics of dishonesty in reward-based systems. While the study adds to current literature on dishonesty in a small-scale environment, its implications are confined in an experimental context and the findings should not be related towards real-world economies without further research.

Language

English

LC Subject

Incentives in industry, Behavioral assessment

Location

UPLB College of Economics and Management (CEM)

Call Number

LG 993.5 2025 E2 M47

Notes

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Document Type

Thesis

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