Hintikka’s socratic epistemology meets Gettier’s counter examples

Issue Date

2017

Abstract

The overall goal of this paper is to apply Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology to Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the process, I will make full use of Socratic Epistemology’s methodology and commitments. This includes, among other things, looking at Gettier’s counterexamples as games between an Inquirer and Nature (the source of information), as well as treating the items in them as pieces of information. The strategy that I employ in this paper also makes use of frames (or partitions). One of the important results of this paper is a scenario where Gettier cannot setup the dilemma for the tripartite definition of knowledge.

Source or Periodical Title

Kriterion (Austria) - Journal of Philosophy

ISSN

1019-8288

Volume

31

Issue

3

Page

25-56

Document Type

Article

Language

English

Subject

Answers, Deductive, Gettier’s counterexamples, Hintikka’s socratic epistemology, Interrogative model of inquiry, Interrogative moves, Knowledge as justified true belief, Logic of questions

Digital Copy

yes

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