On the prospect of an experimental account of argumentation. Commentary: Toward an experimental account of argumentation: The case of the slippery slope and the ad hominem arguments

Issue Date

3-2016

Abstract

Comments on an article by M. Lillo-Unglaube et al. (see record 2015-12866-001). Lillo-Unglaube et al. argue for the employment of more descriptive and experimental accounts on the psychology of argumentation. By utilizing experimental studies concerning the slippery slope and ad hominem arguments using Bayesian and pragmadialectic frameworks, they seek to show how psychology can bring “the cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation closer” for an integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s paper seeks to explain the “rhetorical effectiveness” of some of the informal fallacies. For Lillo-Unglaube et al., when cognitive agents are confronted with the slippery slope and ad hominem arguments, they evaluate “the persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument or the degree of unreasonableness of the ad hominem argument”. Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s work benefited immensely from the works of Hahn and Oaksford. For Hahn and Oaksford, the Bayesian approach helps explain how some informal fallacies can be reasonable inferential moves in some argumentation situations. Viewed in its proper context, one can safely say that Hahn and Oaksford’s analysis is concerned with argument strength which can be understood in terms of degrees unlike logical validity which is a problem for Lillo-Unglaube et al.’s proposal. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)

Source or Periodical Title

Frontiers in Psychology

Volume

7

Issue

299

Page

1-2

Document Type

Article

Language

English

Subject

Argumentation theory, Epistemic aspects of argumentation, Logic, Persuasion, Reasoning

Identifier

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00299

Digital Copy

yes

Link to Full Text

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