Russell and Strawson on definite descriptions: The principle of charity and its role in the appraisal of a philosophical theory

Issue Date

12-2014

Abstract

The principle of charity is an important norm which governs not only philosophical inquiry but also conversations (or talk exchanges). It requires that we adopt the more/most plausible or reasonable interpretation of other people's views in such a way that we ascribe to them the greatest possible consistency and rationality. This paper highlights the importance of the principle of charity in the critical appraisal of a philosophical theory. To further this end, the paper delves into the arguments presented by Strawson against Russell's theory of definite descriptions. In general, Strawson's arguments are not enough to demolish Russell's theory of definite descriptions and the main reason for this is the former's failure to adopt the more/most charitable interpretation of the latter's theory. This paper also argues that the crucial element which Strawson should have considered in evaluating Russell's theory so as to comply with the demands of the principle of charity is the latter's epistemological concern (or project), since this is its proper context. © 2013 by Unisinos.

Source or Periodical Title

Filosofia Unisinos

ISSN

1519-5023

Volume

14

Issue

3

Page

189-203

Document Type

Article

Language

English

Subject

Definite descriptions, Principle of charity, Russell, Strawson

Identifier

doi:10.4013/fsu.2013.143.02.

Digital Copy

yes

Link to Full Text

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