A wittgensteinian response to the scope problem

Issue Date

1-2013

Abstract

This paper seeks to develop a Wittgensteinian response to the Scope Problem, which ensnares a theory of truth considered as inflationary. The scope problem challenges any inflationary truth theory to provide a single explanation which can account for the concept of truth given the diversity of statements that most of us are willing to accept as true. In line with Wittgenstein 's later views on language and philosophy and their corresponding functions, this paper provides a general diagnosis of the problem: similarities in syntax do not entail similarities in meaning. By employing Wittgenstein's metaphors (i.e., 44handles" and 44tools ") and an analysis via concrete cases and analogies, this paper responds to the challenge presented by the Scope Problem not by providing a satisfactory definition of truth but rather, by providing its "dissolution " a la Wittgenstein. Copyright 2012. C&E Publishing, Inc.

Source or Periodical Title

Philosophia (Philippines)

ISSN

2244-1875

Volume

14

Issue

1

Page

27-42

Document Type

Article

College

College of Arts and Sciences (CAS)

Language

English

Digital Copy

yes

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