Policy decisiveness, public regardedness, and unity of purpose: The FATF and the policymaking process for AMLA

Issue Date

1-2011

Abstract

The story of the Anti-Money Laundering Law (AMLA) is about the contemporary impact that an international organization has on the policymaking process. The dynamics of the crafting of this law illustrated the asymmetrical relationship between the international organization and the central policy actors. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a non veto player, through incentives and constraints, profoundly influenced the behavior of the veto players, determined the tempo of the process, and delineated the legislative outcome. First, the FATF, was able to set the agenda and subdue the political inertia that worked against the law in the executive and legislative branches. Second, the FATF ensured the enactment and amendment of the law. Third, it made certain that the law did not cater to vested interests and complied with international standards. The external demand was so overwhelming that the FATF was able to guarantee the unity of purpose (the threat of sanction compelled the veto players to collaborate) that in turn resulted in the policy decisiveness of the process (the unyielding deadline defined the pace and direction of the proceeding), and in the public regarded ness of the policy (the global standard shaped the content of the AMLA). In the theoretical sphere, the engagement between the FATF and institutional policy actors demonstrated a new dimension in the veto players framework, and modified the conventional proposition- that the more veto players, the harder it is to generate or change policy (policy stability), and the more watered down the output policy (private regarded ness) will be. Instead, the presence of an international organization "refashioned" the lawmaking process, making policy enactment easier (policy decisiveness) regardless of the number of veto players, and ensuring that the policy responds more to global interest (public regarded ness,) notwithstanding the presence of a multiplicity of interests among the veto players. © 2011 De La Salle University, Philippines.

Source or Periodical Title

Asia-Pacific Social Science Review

ISSN

0119-8386

Volume

11

Issue

1

Page

79-102

Document Type

Article

Physical Description

diagram

Language

English

Subject

Anti-money laundering, International organization, Policy decisiveness, Policymaking, Public regardedness, Unity of purpose, Veto players

Identifier

doI:10.2139/ssrn.1925325.

Digital Copy

yes

Link to Full Text

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