Bureaucratic incentives, path dependence, and foreign aid: An empirical institutional analysis of irrigation in the Philippines
Issue Date
9-2005
Abstract
At least 25 developing countries are embarking on irrigation governance reforms to address the persistent problem of poor irrigation performance. Some scholars suggest that the patterns of construction, deterioration, rehabilitation, and modernization commonly found among irrigation agencies in these countries are rational because of the time inconsistency problem of information. I argue instead, using panel data from the Philippines, that the problem of poor performance is linked to inherent incentive problems faced by public bureaucracies, how these incentives became entrenched in the path dependence of irrigation development, and how these were reinforced by incentives embedded in irrigation aid, particularly by the moral hazard problem and the fungibility of irrigation aid. © Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005.
Source or Periodical Title
Policy Sciences
ISSN
322687
Volume
38
Issue
2-3
Page
131-157
Document Type
Article
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Eduardo Araral, Jr. (2005). Bureaucratic Incentives, Path Dependence, and Foreign Aid: An Empirical Institutional Analysis of Irrigation in the Philippines. Policy Sciences, 38(2/3), 131–157.
Identifier
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532657
Digital Copy
YES