Economic incentives of international conflicts: a theoretical exposition

E. G. T. Andal

Issue Date

2016

Abstract

This paper explores the event in which a country imposes its power on another country to improve its welfare. It constructs a model of the economic incentives of international armed conflicts and investigates the role of power relations in the furtherance of national welfare. The central result is that in case of an armed conflict, the country with the higher probability of winning has greater wealth and will aim for a larger value of stake from the armed conflict. Furthermore, as the probability of winning the war rises, the price of the stake the country is willing to pay increases.

Source or Periodical Title

Journal of Economics, Management and Agricultural Development (Philippines)

ISSN

2449-4585

Volume

2

Issue

1

Page

15-21

Document Type

Article

Physical Description

graphs ; tables; references

Language

English

Subject

War -- Economic aspects; International economic relations

En – AGROVOC descriptors

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; DEVELOPMENT POLICIES; GOVERNMENT; ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS